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During the American Civil War, President Lincoln and his Administration suspended the right to 
a jury trial by suspending the writ of Habeas Corpus and using military commissions to try 
civilians. This study first explores the suspension of the writ of Habeas Corpus. It then discusses 
262 military commission cases, selected for comparative study. These cases took place between 
1861 and 1866. The purpose of this study is to bring to light a little-known aspect of the Civil 
War, the use of military commissions to try civilians, for use as a tool in future studies, and show 
that the suspension of the right to a jury trial in the past connects to current issues involving 
suspended civil liberties. 
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1.0  WHAT IF THERE WAS NO JURY? 
Trial by jury is one of the most basic rights Americans possess. When we hear this phrase, our 
minds almost instantly conjure images of wood-paneled courtrooms, complete with high 
ceilings, council tables for the attorneys, a jury box, and the judge’s bench. But what if there 
were no attorneys? Or, the attorneys were not allowed to speak? (Some might say that both of 
these are good ideas!) But, what if there was no judge? What if, instead of presenting your case 
to a judge, you presented your case to a panel—a commission. What if the members of this 
commission were military officers instead of civilians? Furthermore, what if there was no jury?  
In his book American Bastile (1881), John A. Marshall asks a judge, “Do you think, 
Judge, that the people are aware to what extent their rights have been lately trampled on and their 
liberties disregarded?”1
                                                 
1 Marshall, John A. American Bastile: A History of the Illegal Arrests and Imprisonment of American Citizens in 
the North and Border States, on Account of Their Political Opinions, During the Late Civil War Philadelphia, PA: 
Thomas Hartley & Co., 1881, p. xii* 
 I was unable to find any biography or background information on 
Marshall. It is also unclear whether Marshall’s conversation with his Honorable friend is 
accurate (it is quite an extensive conversation!). What can be determined, however, is that 
Marshall, writing almost immediately after the Civil War, has a very strong opinion about the 
Lincoln Administration’s suspension of the civil liberty of a trial by jury.  
*Title spelled in this document as it appeared in original print. 
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During the American Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln, with the help of his 
administration and members of the Republican Party, decided to suspend the civil liberty of a 
trial by jury. He did this in two ways. Lincoln suspended the writ of Habeas Corpus and allowed 
civilians to be tried in military courts during the Civil War. This created a great deal of dissent 
from the United States Supreme Court, the Democratic Party, and civilians. Lincoln and his 
administration responded to this by defending the suspension of the right to a jury trial as 
necessary for the safety of the Union. 
The right to a trial by jury and the right of a civilian to not be ruled by military law have 
long been cherished in English and American history. Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, the 
Declaration of Independence, and the Bill of Rights all state how inappropriate it is to use 
military law against civilians or hold a person in prison without charging him with a crime. Writs 
of Habeas Corpus protect the right to a trial by jury. The Latin phrase ‘Habeas Corpus’ means 
‘you have the body’.2 A writ of Habeas Corpus allows a detainee to be brought before a judge to 
determine the sufficiency of the charges being brought against him and to set a date for a formal 
trial proceeding. The act of suspending the writ of Habeas Corpus forced detainees to remain in 
prison for an undetermined amount of time without a trial. Lincoln also authorized his 
commanding generals to try those arrested by military commission or military tribunal, a trial 
very similar to a court-martial. Military tribunals use officer juries as a part of the adjudication 
process, thus denying American citizens the right to a trial by a civilian jury.3
                                                 
2 US Legal Definitions 
  
http://definitions.uslegal.com © 2001-2008, September 2008 
3 Neely, Mark E. The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties Oxford University Press, NY 1991. 41.* 
* In my research, the phrase “military commissions” and “military trial” have been used interchangeably to mean 
“trials of civilians by military authority”. I will also use these terms interchangeably. Furthermore, the Old Military 
Records located at the National Archives use the term “courts-martial” to reference a trial of military personnel by 
the military, whereas the term “military commission” is used to indicate a trial of a civilian by the military. 
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The use of military commissions to try civilians during war did not stop in the nineteenth 
century. In fact, the precedent set down by Lincoln made possible the use of military 
commissions in the twenty-first century, under the Bush Administration, following the events of 
September 11.  
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2.0  “LET ME KNOW WHAT YOU FIND” 
 
In order to graduate with Honors in History at the University of Pittsburgh, students must 
complete an Honors Seminar Course in Writing. It was my Honors Writing Professor, Dr. Hall, 
who first introduced me to the idea of ‘looking into’ Lincoln’s suspension of the right to a jury 
trial. In the second week of the Fall Term of 2008, I still did not have a topic to begin researching 
for my final paper. After discovering my obsession with legal history and my fervent desire to 
attend law school, he suggested I do a simple Google search on “Lincoln and civil liberties,” just 
to “get the ball rolling.” He said, “Let me know what you find. I think you’ll be surprised.”  
And surprised I was. I had discovered an ugly part of American History, a part that none 
of my high school history teachers, for all of my Advanced Placement classes, had taught me 
about, a part of history that I was not supposed to know about. One of America’s most 
mythological figures, Lincoln, had jeopardized one of the most basic liberties—the right to a trial 
by jury. Why did this happen? I followed my research down several avenues. First to the 
arguments presented by historians on whether or not Lincoln was correct to suspend the right to a 
jury trial. What did the ‘experts’—mostly lawyers and historians—think of this? The jury was 
out. The debate was still ongoing. Additionally, the sources were few. While many historians 
have studied Lincoln, and equally as many—if not, more—the Civil War as a whole, few from 
either category even mentioned the suspension of the right to a jury trial. If the suspension was 
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mentioned, the historian would point out the suspension of the writ of Habeas Corpus, but 
completely ignore the use of the military commissions to try civilians.  
Such is the case in Abraham Lincoln and a Nation worth Fighting For
 
 by James A. 
Rawley. The book details the steps taken by President Lincoln to preserve the Union throughout 
the duration of the Civil War. The suspension of Habeas Corpus is briefly mentioned, along with 
the famous case ex parte Merryman. There is no mention, however, of the use of military 
commissions to try civilians. Rawley writes: 
As the war progressed he would by sweeping proclamations suspend the privilege of the 
writ of Habeas Corpus, suppressing civil liberties in the North; emancipate rebels’ slaves held in 
bondage under state law in the South; and assume control of Reconstruction—a power the 
Supreme Court four years after the war ruled belonged to Congress. Still, Lincoln was not a 
dictator as sometimes charged.4
 
  
I include this quote not to agree with or dispute Rawley, only to show that this passage is 
typical of the historical record’s treatment of the suspension of Habeas Corpus. A passage like 
this is similar to most of the secondary sources I found on Lincoln and/or the Civil War. This 
passage simply acknowledges that the suspension of Habeas Corpus occurred while ignoring the 
use of military commissions for civilian trials. It is easy to see how many of the secondary 
sources available to me were not very useful for my research. 
In my research, I have only found two sources with more details of the suspension of 
civil liberties: The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties by Mark E. Neely, and 
Lincoln’s Constitution
                                                 
4 Rawley, James A. Abraham Lincoln and a Nation worth Fighting For University of Nebraska Press: 2003 p. 47 
 by Daniel Farber.  
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Neely presents the suspension of Habeas Corpus, a study of the military arrest records, 
and a brief study of the military commissions that took place in Missouri. For example, when 
discussing the military commissions, Neely states: 
 
The system of trials by military commission definitely stood a step above no law at all, 
and it embodied some mercy as well as military justice. The president did have some kind of 
systematic effect here, because certain kinds of cases were always referred to him, because good 
records were kept of these trials, and because their quantity was limited enough to allow Lincoln 
to examine a substantial percentage of the cases. This is unlike the situation for the masses of 
prisoners of state who were not tried by military commission.5
 
 
Neely’s work, though similar, is fundamentally different, from my work. Neely states in 
his introduction that his book “…will examine…the practical impact on civil liberties of the 
policies Lincoln developed to save the Union.”6
This, however, is where the similarities end. Neely uses the arrest records to understand 
violations of civil liberties during the civil war. My research has centered on the use of military 
commissions. That is to say, instead of looking to the numbers of how many people were 
arrested and where they were imprisoned during the course of the civil war, I looked to the 
records of the trial proceedings. Although Neely also uses trial records from Missouri, I did not 
limit my information to one state because I wanted to understand the widespread use of military 
commissions.  
 Throughout the course of his study, Neely is 
looking for a whole picture of civil liberties in the civil war. Like me, Neely discusses the 
development of the suspension of Habeas Corpus and the justifications given by the Republican 
party for this measure. Neely also briefly discusses the use of the military to try civilians in 
Missouri.  
                                                 
5 Neely, 166 
6 Neely, xi 
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The military court proceedings of the Civil War are more useful for examining the 
widespread suspension of the right to a jury trial because this they give us more than just 
numbers. Instead of saying “X number of people were arrested and held at Fort Y,” we can 
compare the trial records to see how the system was put into practice—how the suspension of the 
right to a trial by jury was actually applied. 
Farber concentrates on the constitutionality of the suspension of Habeas Corpus, 
specifically dealing with how much power the constitution gives the president. For example, in 
Chapter Six, Farber delineates both sides of the question: How much power does the President 
actually have?  
 
Advocates of broad presidential power argue that the vesting clause is the key to Article 
II. Like the clause vesting the judicial power in the federal courts, they contend, it infuses the 
relevant officials with general powers….Their [advocates of broad presidential power] argument 
has not gone unchallenged. Critics retort that there was no well-understood bundle of executive 
powers that could simply be conveyed by the vesting clause….7
 
 
Although both sources have been beneficial to my study of President Lincoln and the 
suspension of the right to a jury trial, they did not give me a full picture. Neither offered much 
information regarding the broader scope of the use of military trials on civilians. 
I decided that maybe it would be best to ‘hear’ from the man himself: Lincoln. Several 
editions of “The Collected Works of Lincoln” later, I had a clear picture that Lincoln was doing 
what he thought the situation called for to save the Union. I also saw that Lincoln’s actions to 
suspend the civil liberty of a trial by jury were challenged even in his own time, however. At this 
point, my research took me through letters written by Roger Taney, Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court, and Edward Bates, Attorney General, to name a few.  
                                                 
7 Farber, Daniel Lincoln’s Constitution University of Chicago Press, 2003. 123 
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I was still not satisfied with my knowledge—or lack thereof—of the military 
commissions authorized by Lincoln and carried out by his commanding officers during the Civil 
War; the second way that Lincoln suspended the right to a trial by jury. I was unsure of what to 
do at this point, however, having almost nothing from secondary sources on the subject. 
Fortunately, I had been reviewing the cases in The War of the Rebellion: The Official Records of 
the Union and Confederate Armies
I spent three days in the second floor research room for eight hours each day. In twenty -
four total hours, I read 162 cases, adding the data from each case to my spreadsheet. Including 
the 100 trials contained in the Official Records, all of which were from Missouri, my final case 
total count came to 262 cases.  
, Serial 2, Volume 1. This compilation of the official records 
from the Civil War included a few examples of military commission trials of civilians in the state 
of Missouri. Setting up a simple Excel Spreadsheet on my computer, I recorded the name of the 
defendant, the date of the trial, the charges brought against the defendant, how the defendant 
pleaded, the findings of the court, the sentence, and whether or not the sentence was carried out, 
in addition to any other relevant trial notes. It was my project advisor, Dr. Karsten, who 
suggested that I expand my comparable data to include cases from other states such as Ohio and 
Maryland. He spoke to the Dean of the Honors College to help fund my trip to the National 
Archives in Washington, D.C., to do more research—examine cases from other states. After 
contacting the National Archives and the University Honors College, I was on my way.  
Another source of great interest to me was John A. Marshall’s American Bastile. This 
book is by far the closest thing to what I am attempting to do. It compiles the stories of a number 
of civilians in the Northern states who were arrested and tried by military commission. Marshall 
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recounts stories of the arrests and trials of civilians. This source is the closest thing I have to a 
first-hand account of the trials. 
This source, however, was not without problems. One of the most pressing problems with 
Marshall is the fact that he is terribly biased against the Republicans and the Lincoln 
Administration. This opens up the possibility that Marshall exaggerates details of the arrests and 
trials. As Neely puts it, American Bastile is “essentially a book of martyrs.”8
My work will focus on the trials themselves. The purpose of my research is to shed light 
on an area of history that, previously, has been rarely studied and, when studied, studied 
ineffectively. I will try to delineate, without bias, how the military commissions were employed 
and how extensively they were used. My work centers on the actual trials, as I attempt to 
understand what occurred during them. My hope is to introduce the military commission 
transcripts as a unique tool that allows Civil War historians to view the suspension of the right to 
a jury trial in multiple ways.  
 Another problem is 
that his accounts of the arrest and trial of the various individuals narrative accounts of 
individuals, without many details of the trial procedure. He is more concerned with the fact that 
those arrested were judges and other, mainly Democratic, public officials, and the conditions 
these people were forced to endure during their incarceration, rather than the trial, the sentence, 
and the evidence. For example, in his account of Clement L. Vallandigham’s arrest, Marshall 
gives so much background on Vallandigham that that chapter takes on the appearance of a mini-
biography.  
 
                                                 
8 Neely, 225 
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3.0  ROADMAP 
My aim is to determine the nature of the military tribunals that took place in the course of the 
Civil War. These records can be of great use in future studies. The trial records contain rich 
details that can be compared. Additionally, understanding the military trials of the Civil War as a 
facet of the suspension of civil liberties during the Civil War can give insight into current 
instances of suspended civil liberties—in particular, the suspension of the right to a trial by jury. 
We can see how our present has been shaped by the past. I will connect the military trials of 
civilians and the suspension of Habeas Corpus during the Civil War with the military 
commissions and the suspension of Habeas Corpus that were recently enacted under George W. 
Bush’s Presidency. 
First, I will set the stage for the presentation of my findings by discussing a few cases that 
many historians are already familiar with: the cases of ex parte Merryman, ex parte 
Vallandigham, and ex parte Milligan. I will detail the facts of the cases, the court rulings and 
opinions, and the historical significance of each case. This will set up a chronological context for 
my findings. I will also bring to light less well-known cases that I found in my research. 
After laying the foundation, I will relate my findings to the greater picture that is 
American History. The Civil War was certainly not the only time that civilians were tried in 
military courts. Under the Bush Administration, “enemy combatants” were detained in military 
prisons in Iraq and Guantanamo Bay without a trial and no ability to petition a court for a writ of 
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Habeas Corpus. Arguments both for and against the actions of the Bush Administration can be 
said to have their roots in Lincoln’s suspension of the right to a jury trial. I will then outline the 
current, ongoing debate amongst modern historians about whether or not Lincoln had the power 
to utilize military commissions for civilians and suspend the privilege of the writ of Habeas 
Corpus.  
Next, I will move into the historical context of the suspension of the civil liberty of a trial 
by jury. I will first discuss the suspension of the writ of Habeas Corpus. I will provide actual 
legislation that was passed by Lincoln, his cabinet, and Congress. I will show both sides of the 
historical debate on the subject. Both sides, those defending Lincoln’s act to suspend the writ of 
Habeas Corpus and those opposing it, drew on the Constitution to support their arguments.  
I will present my research on the military commissions at this point. I will first discuss 
the set-up of the court and the procedures of the court. I will detail my research experience—my 
method and process, problems that I faced while researching, as well as comparing my 
expectations of what I might find to what I actually found. I will then move into explanation of 
my findings. After outlining my research findings, I will explain my conclusion that the military 
commission records can be used as a valuable resource in future studies. The military 
commission records of the Civil War may also help us to understand the current instance of the 
suspension of the right to a jury trial occurring at the United States military prison in 
Guantanamo Bay. I then will outline potential future studies in which the military commission 
records can be utilized.  
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4.0  LINCOLN, TANEY, HABEAS CORPUS, AND MILITARY AUTHORITY 
In 1861, just after the fighting at Fort Sumter began, President Lincoln issued executive orders to 
suspend the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus. The early order suspended the writ in and 
around the Washington, D.C. area and along the railroads leading to Philadelphia including 
Maryland. John Merryman was arrested in Maryland for his participation in the destruction of 
railroad lines and his role in recruiting men for the Confederate Army.9
Jailed by the military, Merryman petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of Habeas 
Corpus. Sitting in the Circuit Court at Baltimore, Chief Justice Taney requested that the prisoner, 
with a copy of the warrant and orders used to arrest the prisoner, be brought before him in court. 
General Cadwalader, the commanding general of Fort McHenry where Merryman was 
imprisoned, refused to comply with the court, citing the executive orders from Lincoln.
  
10
Acting on his own, Taney constructed and published his opinion on Merryman’s 
situation. Taney held that the military had no authority to arrest John Merryman. He argued that 
President Lincoln had no power to suspend the writ of Habeas Corpus or use the military against 
a civilian.  
  
                                                 
9 Finkelman, Paul, “Limiting Rights in Times of Crisis: Our Civil War Experience—A History Lesson for a Post-9-
11 America” Yeshiva University, Cardozo Public Law, Policy, and Ethics Journal, 2003 
10 Ex Parte Merryman 1861 “US Supreme Court Cases” Justia.com US Supreme Court Center September 30, 2008 
http://supreme.justia.com 
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 “No official notice has been given to the courts of justice, or to the public, by 
proclamation or otherwise, that the President claimed this power…The President has exercised a 
power which he does not possess under the Constitution….”11
 
 
This early case illustrates the arrest and trial of civilians by military authority in Civil 
War. Many defendants, like Merryman, and Buckner Morris in Ohio in 1864, did not believe that 
the military could try civilians because it did not have the proper jurisdiction.  
The location: Cincinnati, Ohio, in the middle of December 1864. A military commission 
tried Buckner S. Morris for “conspiring against the US in violation of the laws of war to release 
military prisoners held by the US” and “Conspiracy to destroy the city of Chicago.”12 At sixty-
eight years old, Morris was a well-known and well-liked judge and politician in Illinois.13 In 
American Bastile, Marshall vividly describes Judge Morris being wakened at two o’clock in the 
morning, imprisoned, and then later transferred to Cincinnati for trial before a military 
commission. To both charges and their specifications, Morris pled “Not Guilty.”14
In his response to the charges, Morris alleged that the military commission had no 
jurisdiction over the case for two important reasons. First, Morris and his co-defendants were 
civilians who were in no way connected to the military, therefore not under the color of military 
law. Second, he argued that although Congress had passed an act in 1863 allowing the military to 
try civilians, the military had no jurisdiction over the Northern states, where civilian courts were 
still in session, untouched by the war. His plea asked that he and his co-defendants be allowed 
the opportunity to respond to the charges against them in civil court. Morris maintained, “It 
  
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 National Archives Old Military Records, Civil War, Record Group 153 “Records of the Judge Advocate General”, 
File MM2185, Washington, D.C., July 23, 2009* 
* Henceforth, I will reference materials from the National Archives as “NA: File #” 
13 Marshall, John A., 625 
14 NA: MM2185 
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cannot be claimed that these courts are a matter of necessity, as the civil courts of the land are 
open.”15
In his telling of the events of the trial, Marshall takes care to emphasize the conditions in 
which Judge Morris stood trial. He writes,  
  
 
The trial lasted some four months. During most of this time, the prisoners were chained 
in pairs, and were so marched up and down the streets, to and from the Court, until the public 
began to complain of such barbarous treatment….The trial did not close until the assassination of 
President Lincoln, which the Judge Advocate…used with great force against them, charging the 
prisoners with more or less being the cause thereof. After a confinement of six months they were 
found not guilty and discharged from military custody.16
 
   
The italics used in this quote are Marshall’s, not mine.  
Another case in Ohio became one of the most famous incidents of civilian arrest and 
military trial during the Civil War. This was the case of Clement Vallandigham, a Democratic 
politician famous for vocal opposition to the Civil War. Vallandigham was charged with 
violating orders that prohibited committing “acts for the benefit of the enemy…declaring 
sympathies for the enemy.”17
Marshall goes into extensive detail on this case. He gives a brief biography of 
Vallandigham, and background on Vallandigham’s political career. The narrative then turns to an 
account of Vallandigham’s arrest and military commission. At his trial, Vallandigham argued 
that the military had no jurisdiction over his case.  
 At a gathering in May 1863, Vallandigham allegedly spoke harshly 
against the President, the government, and the war. He was taken into custody and brought to 
trial by military commission.  
                                                 
15 Marshall, John A., 627 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ex parte Vallandigham 68 US 243, 1864 “US Supreme Court Cases” Justia.com US Supreme Court Center 
September 30, 2008 http://supreme.justia.com 
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Vallandigham appealed his case to the Supreme Court. Although Chief Justice Taney had 
initially written an opinion opposing the Merryman decision in 1861 (Taney wanted to grant a 
writ of Habeas Corpus to Merryman), the Supreme Court in 1863 did nothing to help Clement 
Vallandigham. In 1864, Chase had become the new Chief Justice. Chase was an abolitionist 
more willing to go along with the policies of the Lincoln Administration. Justice Wayne 
delivered the opinion of the court, declaring that the Constitution did not allow the Supreme 
Court original jurisdiction of the matter, enumerated in the Constitution.18 The court cited two 
sources of military jurisdiction: the statutes and the “common law of war.” The court stated that 
military commissions, not courts-martial, could try non-military offenses, once military authority 
was established. The court then went on to state that such is the case in a time of rebellion, much 
like “the present one.” The Supreme Court unanimously held that it could not act as an appellate 
court for military commissions because it did not have the authority.19
Lamdin Milligan, civilian, was arrested by the military in Indiana. In 1866, the Supreme 
Court, referred to the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution, and determined 
that Milligan’s rights had been violated, based on the fact that Milligan was a resident—
civilian—of Indiana, a state that had never opposed or challenged the Federal Government. 
 It could be that the 
Supreme Court did not act in this case because it knew that the executive and legislative 
branches of government would ignore a ruling in Vallandigham’s favor. Nevertheless, two years 
later, the Court’s decision in the Milligan Case provided a different result. 
20
                                                 
18 Ibid.  
 
Because Indiana had never opposed the Federal government, the state’s open Circuit Courts that 
would have had the power to issue Milligan a writ of Habeas Corpus, should have been allowed 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ex Parte Milligan 71 US 2, 4 Wall. 2, 18 L.Ed. 281, 1866 US LEXIS 861 (1866), “US Supreme Court Cases” 
Justia.com US Supreme Court Center September 30, 2008 http://supreme.justia.com 
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to do so.21
It is important to note that this case has never been overruled.
 Thus, the military commission that tried Milligan had no real jurisdiction to hear the 
case in the first place.  
22 Because this case has never 
been overturned, it can still be used as precedent if a similar fact pattern ever arose.23
 
 This case 
has recently been referenced as mandatory authority, or a rule that must be followed, for 
decisions arising from the detention of suspected “enemy combatants” in the United States 
military prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
22A search of Shepard’s on LexisNexis has returned a result of ‘no negative case history’, ‘cited’ in 476 cases, and 
‘followed’ in 12 cases. This means that the Milligan case has not been overturned. The case was first cited in 1871 
as a part of the Legal Tender cases. Recently, it been cited in the case Boumedine v. Bush (55 US__2008. In the 
Boumedine case, the United States Supreme Court determined that the Military Commissions Act of 2006 was an 
“unconstitutional suspension of habeas corpus” with a 5-4 majority decision.* 
*Boumedine v. Bush (2008), Oyez.org http://oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007-06-1195 October 10, 2009  
23Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 4 Wall. 2, 18 L. Ed. 281, 1866 U.S. LEXIS 861 (1866), Shepard’s ® Monday, 
October 12, 2009, University of Pittsburgh, Barco Law Library 
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5.0  AMERICA IN THE CIVIL WAR, AMERICA POST- SEPTEMBER 11 
Why are military trials of the Civil War era significant to us today? True, Lincoln’s suspension 
of the writ of Habeas Corpus and military commissions ignited controversy during the Civil War. 
Americans asked how much power the president actually has according to the Constitution. 
Americans asked who was empowered to suspend the ‘Great Writ’—Congress or the President. 
Americans also questioned whether military commissions could be used to try civilians in all 
settings. However, the questions and debates did not end in 1866. 
Historians today are arguing the same questions and recalling the same arguments made 
in the 1860s to either attack or defend the Lincoln Administration. Almost immediately after the 
Civil War, Marshall wrote that he was seeking to preserve the memory in history, “for the 
purpose of preventing repetition of errors.” His tone was highly critical of the Lincoln 
Administration.24
 
  
During those troublous times, when civil authority was made subordinate to military 
power, it seemed to be the object of the government at Washington to appoint agents to execute 
its edicts, who were ignorant of both civil and military law; who knew not the consequences 
which would flow from arbitrary and illegal acts; who were brutal in their natures, and who, 
from this ignorance, brutality, and irresponsibility, would commit the most flagitious wrongs 
upon innocent citizens, regardless of either law or justice.25
 
 
                                                 
24 Marshall, John A., xxii 
25 Ibid, 713-714 
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Some historians support Lincoln’s actions, arguing the president was doing everything 
within his power to keep order in the war-zones and keep peace within the public. Historian 
Mark E. Neely defends Lincoln’s actions. He explains that Lincoln wanted to protect the United 
States and keep all states under the power of the Constitution. Judge Richard A. Posner agrees 
with Neely’s view of Lincoln’s actions. In his article “Security versus Civil Liberties,” Posner 
states that in times of national crisis,  civil liberties tend to—and should—take a backseat to 
security. He advocates a “cost-benefit” analysis, stating that 
 
[Civil liberties] should be curtailed, to the extent that the benefits in greater security 
outweigh the costs of reduced liberty. All that can reasonably be asked of the responsible 
legislative and judicial officials is that they weigh the costs as carefully as the benefits.26
 
 
He then argues that law is able to change and grow depending on the situation and 
circumstances for which it is needed. Posner argues that Lincoln was correct in choosing to 
protect the nation over civil liberties. As he puts it, “[Law] is an instrument for promoting social 
welfare, and as the conditions essential to that welfare change, so it must change.”27
Other historians believe that Lincoln abused his power as President. Historian James 
Randall, one of the first historians to study Lincoln’s suspension of Habeas Corpus and use of 
military tribunals, took a more critical view of Lincoln than Neely, arguing that Lincoln’s actions 
overstepped the presidential boundaries outlined in the Constitution. Writer David Greenberg 
agrees with Randall. Greenberg argues that although the United States was in the midst of an 
emergency, Lincoln’s actions were not the only viable options for national preservation. He 
notes that there were no controls on those individuals with the power to make arrests, creating a 
 
                                                 
26 Posner, Richard A. “Security versus Civil Liberties” The Atlantic December 2001 www.theatlantic.com 
December 2, 2008 
27 Ibid 
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state of near anarchy. He ends his article by calling Lincoln’s decisions concerning civil liberties 
a “sad mistake.”28
The use of military commissions to try non-military persons has continued up to the 
present-day. After the events of September 11, 2001, suspected participants and accomplices 
were detained in the United States at Charleston, South Carolina’s brig, and at the military prison 
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Former President George Bush suspended the writ of Habeas Corpus 
for these detainees. This prohibited them from challenging their detention and the allegations 
against them in federal court. President Bush also introduced military commissions as a method 
of trial.
  
29
The debate on the legality of these actions has drawn sharp responses from both sides. 
Supporters of the Bush Administration’s policies have drawn on history. They recall the events 
of the Civil War—Lincoln’s own suspension of Habeas Corpus and use of military commissions. 
Supporters, such as Judge Frank Williams, Chief Justice of the Rhode Island Supreme Court and 
member of the review panel for appeals for the military commissions of Guantanamo Bay, recall 
that during the Civil War, the Supreme Court dismissed appeals calling for the “Great Writ”—
the Milligan decision did not come about until 1866 when the war was over.
   
30
One of the most vocal opponents of the suspension of Habeas Corpus and the use of the 
military commissions is the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). The ACLU argued that the 
 Supporters also 
note that the detainees in these recent instances are neither United States citizens nor (for the 
most part) on United States soil.  
                                                 
28 Greenberg, David “Lincoln’s Crackdown” Slate History Lesson September 12, 2008. http://www.slate.com, 
November 30, 2001* 
*I understand the political and controversial nature of this source. I include it not for the accuracy of the statements, 
but as an illustration of a modern opposing opinion of Lincoln’s suspension of the right to a jury trial. 
29 Williams, Frank J. “Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties in Wartime” Lecture #834 The Heritage Foundation. 
May 5, 2004, September 2008. http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl834.cfm  
30 Ibid.  
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military commissions are not criminal trials with the full rights and protections of due process. 
The ACLU strongly objected to the procedures of these trials because these trials unfairly permit 
the admission of evidence that would be excluded during a regular criminal procedure.31
 
 
Opponents of the military commissions and suspension of Habeas Corpus argue that the current 
situation is identical to the Milligan Case. Take this excerpt from a current Supreme Court case, 
for example: 
Congress authorized the president to use force against ‘those nations, organizations, or 
persons’ responsible, which included both the Taliban and al Qaeda; during the Civil War, 
Congress authorized the president to use force to combat ‘unlawful obstructions, combinations, 
or assemblages of persons, or rebellion,’ a description which certainly encompassed the Sons of 
Liberty…Although Milligan was not a member of the Confederate military, he—like Al-Marri—
was accused of belonging to an ‘enemy’ organization against which the president could use 
military force.32
 
 
This quote is from one of the amicus curiae, or "friend of the court", briefs filed for one 
of the current cases before the United States Supreme Court: Al-Marri v. Spagone. Current cases 
dealing with the issue of the rights of detainees include Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004), Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld (2006), Boumedine v. Bush (2008), and Al-Marri v. Spagone (2009).33
                                                 
31 American Civil Liberties Union “Protecting the Rule of Law” September 2008. 
 Each of these 
cases, like the cases of John Merryman, Clement Vallandigham, and Lamdin Milligan 
challenged the authority of the government—particularly the executive branch—to suspend the 
right to a jury trial.   
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/detention/johnadams.html  
32 Al-Marri v. Spagone Amicus Curiae Civil War Historians in Support of Petitioner January 28, 2009 (Courtesy of 
Paul Finkelman, President William McKinley Distinguished Professor of Law and Public Policy and Senior Fellow, 
Government Law Center Albany Law School, Albany NY) p. 15 
33 In March 2009, the Supreme Court determined at the Al-Marri case was moot because Al-Marri was transferred 
out of military custody and turned over to the custody of the Attorney General.* 
*”Al-Marri v. Spagone” The American Civil Liberties Union, “Order Vacating the Lower Court’s Judgment and 
Dismissing the Case as Moot” Posted March 6, 2009. Accessed October 27, 2009. 
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/detention/38954lgl20090306.html  
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I bring all of this up simply to show that issues regarding the suspension of civil liberties, 
particularly the right to a trial by jury, have not yet been put to rest. The existence of current 
cases before the Supreme Court shows that the Lincoln Administration’s actions are still 
relevant.  
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6.0  SUSPENDING HABEAS CORPUS 
Lincoln’s decisions to suspend trial by jury differed by region of the nation. In the South and in 
the Border States, Lincoln used the military as his judicial system to prosecute guerillas. Lincoln 
gave military officers control of the occupied areas in the South and in the Border States. Justice 
by military tribunal did not allow for a jury. Lincoln received the most criticism for the 
suspension of civil liberties in the North, where civilians that had been denied the right trial by 
jury did not live in a war-zone. I will explore the viewpoint of those opposed to Lincoln’s 
policies: Democratic Politicians, Civilians, and the Supreme Court.  
Shortly after the Civil War began, Lincoln took action against the right to a jury trial by 
suspending the writ of Habeas Corpus in the summer of 1861. Lincoln’s first action came in the 
form of executive order. 34
The Commanding General of the Army of the United States: You are engaged in 
suppressing an insurrection against the laws of the United States. If at any point on or in the 
vicinity of any military, line which is now or which shall be used between the city of 
Philadelphia and the city of Washington you find resistance which renders it necessary to 
suspend the writ of Habeas Corpus for the public safety, you personally, or through the officer in 
command at the point where resistance occurs, are authorized to suspend that writ. Given under 
my hand and the seal of the United States, at the city of Washington, this 27th day of April, 
1861, and of the Independence of the United States the eighty-fifth. Abraham Lincoln. By the 
President of the United States: William H. Seward, Secretary of State.
 It reads: 
35
                                                 
34 McPherson, James M, Ordeal By Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction 3rd ed. McGraw-Hill Humanities, Social 
Sciences, and World Languages, NY: 2000. 285-286.  
  
35 Woolley, John T. and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project, University of California September 18, 2008 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=69748. 
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Congress formally supported this policy in a July special session when it allowed the 
president the power to suspend the writ of Habeas Corpus if he determined that the nation was 
confronted with rebellion, or a serious threat to the public safety.36
Lincoln’s executive order enacted a state of martial law and suspended the writ of Habeas 
Corpus for any Confederate soldiers captured in and around the Washington, DC  and Baltimore, 
Maryland area, as well as any person aiding—or suspected of aiding—the Confederate cause in 
April 1861.
  
37
Congress passed a second Habeas Corpus act in autumn 1862. This act expanded the 
suspension of Habeas Corpus in the North as a measure of enforcing the newly passed Militia 
Act. The Militia Act of 1862 gave the President the power to call out the military at his 
discretion.  
 Passed as a security measure, the act stated that if Washington came under attack, 
the capital would temporarily move to Philadelphia. This order was to protect Philadelphia, 
Baltimore, and Washington, and the keep the route open for President Lincoln and any potential 
communiqués. It also added extra security to the capital. According to Neely, “The purpose of 
the initial suspension of the writ of Habeas Corpus is clear from the circumstances of its 
issuance: to keep the military reinforcement route to the nation’s capital open.” The first order 
that Lincoln passed only suspended the right to a jury trial as an obvious security measure in a 
limited area.  
 
With the fact apparent that a portion of the citizens of the United States, repudiating their 
allegiance to the Constitution and laws of the Union…it seems that an emergency has arisen 
where the Executive arm should be clothed with requisite power and authority to preserve the 
government…and protect the honor of its flag…Under the provisions of this bill, the President 
                                                 
36 Randall, James G. Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln- Revised Edition University of Illinois Press 1951. 129. 
37 Neely, 9 
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can, at his discretion, call into the field every individual in the United States subject to military 
duty.38
 
 
The second Habeas Corpus act appeared in print for the first time in the October 11, 1862 
edition of Harper’s Weekly newspaper, under the headline “Domestic Intelligence: A 
Proclamation.”39
…All persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any 
disloyal practice affording aid and comfort to the rebels against the authority of the United 
States, shall be subject to martial law, and liable to trial and punishment by courts-martial or 
military commission. Second: That the writ of Habeas Corpus is suspended in respect to all 
persons arrested, or who are now, or hereafter during the rebellion shall be, imprisoned in any 
fort, camp, arsenal, military prisons, or other place of confinement, by any military authority, or 
by the sentence of any court-martial or military commission.
 This new act targeted anyone who interfered with the war effort by 
discouraging the draft or assisting Confederates. This act detailed military arrest for such action 
without a trial by jury.  
40
 
 
A third Habeas Corpus Act was issued by the Republican-majority congress in 1863. This 
particular act targeted Northern civilians—citizens living outside of a war-zone. This act 
acknowledged “a rebellion has existed and is still existing” and that the “public safety does 
require” that those aiding, abetting, spying, or violating the laws of warfare, could be held and 
tried without being issued a writ of Habeas Corpus.41 Lincoln then pronounced that “Habeas 
Corpus is suspended throughout the United States” and the suspension would continue until the 
rebellion has passed.42
                                                 
38 US Congressional Set 36th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives Report No. 58 
  
39 “Domestic Intelligence: A Proclamation” Harper’s Weekly Newspaper. October 11, 1862. 
http://www.sonoftheSouth.net/leefoundation/civil-war/1862/october/lincoln-writ-habeas-corpus.htm  
40 Ibid. 
41 Woolley  
42 Ibid 
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What does the Constitution tell us about Habeas Corpus? The exact wording concerning 
writs of Habeas Corpus can be found in Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the Constitution, which 
states: 
 
 The privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases 
of rebellion or invasion of the public safety may require it. 
 
This clause appears in the passages (Article I, Section 9) that deal essentially with the 
powers of Congress.  
There is no mention within the language of the Constitution of who may specifically 
suspend the writ of Habeas Corpus in times of emergency. This created a great deal of 
controversy. The Republicans felt the President had every power to suspend the writ as he saw fit 
because there was no formal Constitutional specification. The Democrats, however, believed that 
only Congress had the ability to suspend the writ because the clause appeared in a section of the 
Constitution that appeared to deal with Congressional power.   
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7.0  VOCAL DISSENT 
The primary arguments against Lincoln’s suspension of Habeas Corpus and use of military law 
to suspend the civil liberty of trial by jury mainly come in the form of Supreme Court dicta and 
Constitutional argumentation. Much of this argumentation comes from Chief Justice Taney, a 
Maryland Democrat. In the Merryman case, Taney first stated that only the Congress had the 
power to suspend the writ of Habeas Corpus—not the president. Because the only mention of 
Habeas Corpus in the Constitution occurs in the article dealing largely with Congress, Taney 
writes that the matter was one that could only be settled by Congress. According to Taney, 
Lincoln had no constitutional authority to proclaim a suspension of Habeas Corpus.43 Taney also 
recalled that the framers of the Constitution, fearful of kings and powerful executives, attempted 
to limit executive power.44
The Vallandigham incident provides another example of public unrest over the 
suspension of the right to a jury trial, as well as an example of the Democratic Party’s 
perspective on the situation. Democratic Representative Clement Vallandigham from Ohio was 
arrested by the military for “treason”. The arrest of Vallandigham caused uproar in the 
Democratic Party of Ohio, calling the action “military despotism”.
 In his view, even the president is bound by the Constitution.  
45
                                                 
43 Ibid. 
  
44  Ex Parte Merryman  
45 McPherson, 377 
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The most vocal dissent for the suspension of the right to a jury trial came from Northern 
civilians. These dissenters, mainly members of the Democratic Party, maintained that they were 
attacked unfairly by Lincoln’s policies because military law was forced upon them and their right 
to a trial by jury was taken away through the suspension of the writ of Habeas Corpus, as 
Merryman, Morris, and Vallandigham maintained. They were civilians who did not live within a 
war-zone. The Northern civilians who were arrested claimed that they did not live in a war-zone, 
therefore, the military did not have jurisdiction over them. In the north, the normal state and 
federal courts, remained open and functioning, and therefore should have retained jurisdiction. 
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8.0  “PRESERVE, PROTECT, AND DEFEND” 
The arguments presented in defense of the actions of the Lincoln Administration’s actions also 
focused on the Constitution, with special attention to the Habeas Corpus clause and the duties of 
the office of the executive. Lincoln defended his own actions on two occasions. First, in the 
special session of Congress, called on July 4, 1861, after the first suspension of Habeas Corpus; 
the second time, after the Vallandigham incident and riots opposing the draft in New York City. 
Attorney General Bates also defended Lincoln’s actions, citing Supreme Court cases in addition 
to the Constitution. Bates arguments appeared in an early letter to the House of Representatives 
following Chief Justice Taney’s Merryman opinion in 1861.  
Lincoln viewed the United States as the center of liberty. If the Union could be preserved, 
then liberty everywhere could be preserved. Lincoln reasoned that by proclaiming military law 
and suspending jury trials, the rebellion could be suppressed more quickly. He first expressed 
this view in his letter to the House of Representatives to be read in the special session of 
Congress he called for July 4, 1861. This session took place after the first Habeas Corpus Act 
had been passed. He held that as president, he had an obligation to preserve the Constitution no 
matter what the cost.46
 
   
                                                 
46 Neely, Mark E. “The Lincoln Administration and Arbitrary Arrests: A Reconsideration” The History Cooperative. 
1983. September 12, 2008 http://www.historycooperative.org 
 35 
…No choice was left but to call out the war power of the Government…for its 
preservation…This authority has been purposefully exercised but very sparingly. It was not 
believed that any law was violated. It was decided that we have a case of rebellion, and that the 
public safety does require the qualified suspension of the privilege of the writ [of Habeas 
Corpus]…the Constitution itself, is silent as to…who, is to exercise the power; and as the 
provision was plainly made for a dangerous emergency, it cannot be believed that the framers of 
the instrument intended, that in every case, the danger should run its course, until Congress could 
be called together; the very assembling of which might have prevented, as was intended in this 
case, by the rebellion….47
 
 
In this statement, Lincoln asked the Congress to approve the actions he had taken in the 
emergency. He asked Congress to consider the weight of the emergency: if even one dissatisfied 
state were permitted to leave the Union peacefully, there would be no way to stop every state 
from leaving. Lincoln argued that the Constitution would have no power and as President, he 
would be breaking his oath to protect the Constitution. This oath can be found in Article 2, 
Section 1, Clause 8, “The Presidential Oath of Office”.  
 
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of the President of 
the United States, and will to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the 
Constitution of the United States. 
 
Lincoln defended his actions more publicly in 1863, when he sent two letters of reply to 
different groups of Democrats in New York and Ohio. In both letters, he emphasized the 
necessity of his actions.  
In the Corning Letter—the reply to the group of New York Democrats led by Erastus 
Corning—Lincoln addressed a set of proposed resolutions that called for the repeal of the Habeas 
Corpus acts. This communication occurred just before the famous New York Draft Riots began 
in response to Lincoln’s Conscription Act of 1862. Lincoln defended his suspension of Habeas 
                                                 
47 Levy, Leonard “Message to Special Session of Congress, 1861” The Political Thought of Abraham Lincoln The 
American Heritage Series 1967. 180-190 
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Corpus, the Conscription Act, and his use of military law, calling the measures “preventative in 
purpose.”48
 
 Lincoln meant to use the suspensions of the right to a jury trial as a way of stopping 
uprisings before they began and enforcing the new conscription act. He wrote: 
Long experience has shown that armies cannot be maintained unless desertion shall be 
punished by the severe penalty….Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I 
must not touch a hair of a wiley agitator who induces him to desert? I think that in such case, to 
silence the agitator, and save the boy, is not only constitutional, but, withal, a great mercy.49
 
 
Lincoln also addressed the issue of the Vallandigham incident. This letter came from the 
Ohio Democratic Convention asking for Vallandigham’s release. In this letter, Ohio Democrats 
argued that Vallandigham was arrested for speaking out against the government, a violation of 
the First Amendment. A speech Vallandigham had given a few days before his arrest called the 
war “wicked” and “unnecessary.”50 In his letter, Lincoln argued that Vallandigham was not 
arrested on a free speech issue; rather, he was arrested for interfering with the military by 
inciting soldiers to desert and men to avoid the draft.51 He wrote that Vallandigham made his 
speeches with the intent to “stir up the men against the prosecution of the war.…”52
Attorney General Bates sent a letter to the House of Representatives in July of 1861, a 
response to a letter from the Speaker of the House that asked for an opinion on the legality of the 
acts and a response to Taney’s Merryman opinion strongly critical of the Lincoln 
administration.
 
53
                                                 
48 Neely, “The Lincoln Administration and Arbitrary Arrests: A Reconsideration” 
  Bates’ response stated, first, that he agreed with Lincoln. One of his arguments 
49 Levy, 255* 
*I copied the text as it appears. 
50 Farber, 171 
51 Levy, 264 
52 Ibid 
53 This document was another accidental find on my part, one day while I was searching through the Congressional 
Serial Set at the library. I have seen this letter published in only one compilation of documents about Constitutional 
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from the Constitution is very similar to Lincoln’s argument found within the Corning Letter 
concerning the Presidential Oath of Office. Bates pointed out that while other government 
officials must swear to support the Constitution, only the President must swear to defend it.54 As 
a part of this oath, the president has the power to use the military if he deems it necessary, 
especially “when the existence of the nation is assailed by a great and dangerous insurrection.” 
This would include the power to use the military to arrest spies and other conspirators.55
Bates then cited the Supreme Court case of Luther v. Borden as an example of a prior 
emergency when armed force was needed to put down rebellion.
  
56 In this case, the State of 
Rhode Island was in the midst of a rebellion in 1841, over whether or not the State should adopt 
a new State Constitution, rather than continue to a previous one, which limited the franchise to 
property owners.57 To put down the rebellion, the state militia was called out. Luther argued that 
the current government of Rhode Island was not a “republican form of government” as 
mentioned in the United States Constitution.58 Bates drew attention to the fact that in Luther v. 
Borden, the court observed that the decision to call out the state militias rested with the president, 
as only the president could decide what situation required the use of military force.59
 
 This part of 
the Luther v. Borden decision was based on an act from 1795 that stated:  
                                                                                                                                                             
History, Allen Johnson’s 1912 publication Readings in American Constitutional History, but I have never seen it 
cited in any discussion of the suspension of civil liberties during the civil war. 
54 US Congressional Serial Set, Vol. 1114, Session Vol. 1, 37th Congress, 1st Session, House Executive Document 5, 
page  6 
55 Ibid 
56 Ibid., 11 
57 Luther v. Borden (1849) “US Supreme Court Cases” Justia.com US Supreme Court Center September 30, 2008 
http://supreme.justia.com 
58 Ibid. 
59 US Congressional Serial Set,11 
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…in case of an insurrection in any State against the government…it shall be lawful for 
the President of the United States…to call forth such number of the militia of any other State or 
States…as he may judge sufficient to suppress such insurrection.60
 
 
Bates noted that President Lincoln was acting within the scope of this decision, therefore, 
within the scope of the law. An insurrection broke out in the Southern states and the President 
was simply calling forth the militia to put down the rebellion and restore the states to a 
republican form of government. 
Professor Karsten noted Bates’ omission of President Lincoln’s justification for 
suspending the writ of Habeas Corpus in the Northern States. It is important to note the context 
of this letter. In 1861, when Bates wrote this letter, any suspensions of Habeas Corpus were 
thought to be a necessary part of a military zone protecting the United States capital. This letter 
does not justify the suspension of the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus in the North because 
the suspension had not yet been issued.  
Bates closed his argument with the reminder that these measures to suspend trial by jury 
were only temporary measures designed to save the nation in the hour of crisis. He then called 
upon the Congress to support President Lincoln’s temporary suspensions of the right to a jury 
trial.  
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9.0  MILITARY COURT SET-UP AND PROCEDURES 
The term “military commission” is defined as “a military court organized in a time of war or 
suspension of civil power to try offenses by persons (civilians) not subject to court by a court-
martial.”61 In addition to suspending the writ of Habeas Corpus, President Lincoln permitted the 
civilian population to be tried in military courts. Using military commissions differs from 
suspending the right to a jury trial than suspending the writ of Habeas Corpus. In a Habeas 
Corpus case, a judge strives to determine whether the detainee’s right to due process was 
violated in his or her detention, instead of determining the guilt of the accused.62
The military commission trials have a different courtroom set-up than civilian trials. George 
B. Davis’ 
 A military 
commission trial determines the guilt of a civilian without giving the civilian an opportunity to 
have a jury of peers present. 
A Treatise on the Military Law of the United States
 
 dedicated a chapter to the military 
commissions of the Civil War. He observes that: 
Except in so far as to invest military commissions in a few cases with special jurisdiction and 
power of punishment, the statute law has failed to define their authority, nor has it made 
provision in regard to their constitution, composition, or procedure.63
 
 
                                                 
61 Military commission. Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law. Merriam Webster, Inc. October 13, 2009 
dictionary.com http://dictionaryreference.com/browse/militarycommission  
62 US Legal Definitions http://definitions.uslegal.com © 2001-2008, September 2008 
63 Davis, George B. “Martial Law” A Treatise on the Military Law of the United States 3rd Ed. 1913 NY: Wiley and 
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In my research, I did not find direct evidence, such as a piece of legislation that dictated the 
proper court composition and procedure. Rather, I found that every trial transcript began with the 
following header: general orders calling the commission into session and the list of officers on 
the commission. For example, the record of the case of J.B. Dawson, in December, 1863, in 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, began in the following way: 
 
Proceedings of a military commission, which convened at Head Quarter Department of the 
Monongahela, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, by virtue of the following special order: Head Quarter 
Department of the Monongahela, Pittsburgh, Pa., Dec. 15th, 1863. Special Order No. 92. A 
military commission is hereby appointed to meet at Pittsburgh, Penna, on Wednesday the 11th, 
inst., or as soon thereafter as practicable for the trial of such persons as may be brought before 
it.64
 
 
Following this introduction, which could be changed to fit the time, location, and general 
order number, a list of the members of the commission was presented under the heading “Detail 
for the Commission.” Because most trials took multiple days to complete, a list of commission 
members present, with the date and time, is given with a formal header at the beginning of the 
trial record for that day. Dawson’s case took three days.65
The set-up of the military commission was quite different from that of a civilian court 
proceeding. Although there appeared to be no formal statutory rules from above other than the 
self-imposed one of a professional soldier, the military commissions of the Civil War generally 
followed the following arrangement: a presiding judge advocate, and a commission of at least 
three officers. The commission questioned the defendant. Witnesses were produced, sworn, 
  
                                                 
64 NA: MM1204 
65 Dawson was charged with “defrauding the United States government”. He pled ‘guilty’, and was imprisoned in 
the Western Penitentiary of Pennsylvania. His sentence was approved by President Lincoln (I have a copy of the 
signature). When the war was over, Dawson petitioned President Johnson for release, although it is unclear whether 
this was granted. 
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questioned by the commission, and questioned by the defendant. Evidence was introduced by 
both sides. Evidence could consist of physical objects or documents. One case, the trial of Henry 
Sack at Fort Monroe in Virginia, March 1864, contained numerous documents labeled as 
exhibits.66
As a matter of procedure, each trial was recorded. Multiple transcripts were made for 
many cases. A copy of each trial’s transcript was sent to higher officers so that the findings and 
sentence could be approved. If the higher officer disapproved of the findings, he would send a 
letter back to the commanders of the military districts, detailing his reasons for disapproving the 
findings and instructing the district officers to either release the prisoner or retry the case. For 
example, Michael Wade, on trial in North Carolina for larceny, was released despite a guilty 
plea, because of “irregularities within the trial record.”
 The charges against Sack included “acting as a spy”. The union army believed that the 
letters he carried across military lines contained valuable information. Sack argued that (and the 
files in the National Archives have shown) the letters were actually of a personal nature, from 
family and friends, attempts to maintain correspondence despite the war. At the National 
Archives, the letters are contained in the case file from Henry Sack. A review of the file has 
shown that the letters were, in fact, of personal nature—letters between cousins, aunts, uncles, 
siblings, and parents. At the end of the trial, Sack was sentenced to “Death by hanging.” This 
sentence, however, was not Sack’s fate. President Lincoln converted the sentence to 
imprisonment.  
67 The higher officer could also write to 
his commanding officer, sometimes to the Secretary of War or the President. When a death 
sentence was recommended, the President reviewed the case and approved the sentence.68
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68 Neely, 41 
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10.0  THE TRIBULATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
Researching the suspension of civil liberties during the Civil War proved to be a challenging 
experience. Studies of the suspension of Habeas Corpus or the use of military commissions 
during Lincoln’s presidency suffer from two shortcomings. The first is Lincoln’s place as a 
mythological figure in American History. Many historians are so in awe of Lincoln that they do 
not say a critical thing about him. These books might state a few words about the suspension of 
Habeas Corpus, mention the Merryman Case, spend another few lines justifying or defending 
Lincoln and his administration for these actions, and then move on without mention of the use of 
military commissions or details of the other side of the coin—reasons why the suspension of 
Habeas Corpus might have been seen as unconstitutional. The second problem is exactly the 
opposite. Other historians bitterly criticize Lincoln for suspending civil liberties. These historians 
devote books to tearing down President Lincoln without allowing that he may have felt that the 
suspension of the right to a jury trial was the only thing he could have done to preserve the 
Union.  
There can be no substitute, however, for primary sources. The first source I turned to was the 
most obvious for any Civil War historian: The War of the Rebellion: The Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Armies (also known as the “Official Records” or “OR’s”) series two, 
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volume one.69
I was unsure of what to expect when I arrived in D.C. at the National Archives. I was mainly 
concerned that I would not find many more cases beyond what has already been published from 
Missouri. I should not have worried. I found quite a few cases and had enough time to read 162 
of them (out of 5,278). I did encounter a few unexpected issues to deal with, though. One of the 
first problems I had to solve was managing my time. I needed to get through as many records as 
quickly as possible. This problem was aggravated by the fact that the records of courts-martial 
trials (the military trials of military persons) were mixed with the military commissions (trials of 
civilians by the military). I had to go over every scrap of paper to distinguish one type of trial 
from the other. In the “Finding Aids” room, when I made my document requests, I attempted to 
solve the “time problem” by first requesting as many documents allowed at a time (30) and then 
by requesting files that I knew contained multiple military commission cases. When the file 
boxes were brought out, I searched the file I requested, as well as the rest of the files in the box. I 
also used a spreadsheet to keep track of my data, photocopying cases when necessary. This made 
note taking a quick, organized, mechanical process.  
 This volume contains approximately 100 cases from Missouri, exactly as found at 
the National Archives in Washington, D.C. I also traveled to the National Archives to get a 
broader spectrum of cases beyond Missouri. 
Another unexpected problem was with the records themselves. Some pages of the records 
were neatly typed, numbered sheets of paper, most likely transcribed from the original, 
handwritten version (usually attached) at a later date. Most of the records, however, were 
bunches of handwritten notes, either tied together, stacked together, folded together, or in some 
instances, written over the top of a previous note or between the lines of a previous note. I had to 
                                                 
69 I checked this volume out of the library, and subsequently kept renewing it until I found a copy of my own. 
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read carefully to sort out what was actually occurring in the trial. There were a few records, 
however, where a signature or word was just plain illegible. This should be a lesson to us all 
about the value of neat handwriting.  
The last major problem I encountered while working at the Archives was the incompleteness 
of the historical record. I found that a few cases, such as George Cantril’s trial, which had 
incomplete files.70
 
 In December of 1864, Cantril was tried by military commission in Cincinnati, 
Ohio, for allegedly “conspiring against the US in violation of the laws of war to release military 
prisoners held by the US, and conspiring to destroy the city of Chicago”. Cantril was allegedly a 
part of the same conspiracy that Judge Morris (discussed earlier) was charged with. The record 
indicates that Cantril pled “not guilty” to both charges. Unfortunately, however, it is unknown 
exactly what happened to Mr. Cantril because the record simply stops there. It is incomplete. All 
I can do is to acknowledge the fragmentary nature of the record when relevant. 
 
                                                 
70 NA: File # MM2185 
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11.0  262 CASES 
I focused my research on eight main areas: name of the person on trial, year of the trial, location 
of the trial, charges brought against the accused, how the accused pled to the charges, the 
commission’s verdict, the sentence, and whether the sentence was approved. My batch of cases 
from the National Archives, combined with the 100 cases from the Official Records, yielded 262 
cases to examine.  
As mentioned earlier, I was quite pressed for time during my research at the National 
Archives. With two days cut off for travel to and from Washington, I only had three full days to 
research. This time constraint affected the way I chose the cases I studied. To choose my cases, I 
flipped through the finding-aid spreadsheet (roughly eighty pages in length), where every case 
was listed with its year, location, and file number. I tried to pick the file numbers that seemed to 
contain the most cases for me to go through at one time—like trying to get the most “bang for 
my buck.”  
The files that I requested were brought to me inside of the box that I had requested. With 
that, I was able to go through the entire box, getting more folders, and therefore more cases, than 
I had initially requested or expected. This made things move a little faster. I was slowed a bit, 
however, by the fact that the courts-martial trials are mixed in with the military commissions. 
For this reason, I needed to read the opening page of every single case, determine whether it was 
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what I was looking for (that is to say, a military commission), and then either put the case back 
or keep reading.  
I acknowledge that this study is not scientific in nature. I also acknowledge that the 
organization of the files may have slanted my findings. Each box generally contained files of 
cases from the same time. However, because cases can last many years, the organization was not 
exactly chronological. The cases in each box also tended to come from the same state, but again, 
this was not the rule.  
Once I determined that the case was a military commission, I first examined the year that the 
trial took place. I wanted to find temporal patterns in the trial record. The trials I examined 
ranged in year from 1861 to 1866. I found six trials that were undated. I found the least amount 
of trials in 1866—three. This contrasts sharply with the year 1862. I studied 86 cases from 1862. 
Exactly 30 trials come from the year 1861, and 32 from 1864. The year 1863 had 57, while the 
year 1865 had 48. In the year 1865, I have only one case before Lincoln’s assassination, taking 
place in March of that year. Maybe the increase in the number of military commissions is a result 
of, or at least related to, the assassination of President Lincoln and the introduction of President 
Johnson. It is interesting to note the decline in the number of cases from 1862 through 1864. This 
contrasts with the increase in the number of cases after Lincoln’s death. 
I also attempted to determine about how long detainees were held, from time of arrest, to the 
time of the trial, so that I could find out whether or not civilian defendants, even without a jury, 
were denied the right to a “speedy trial,” as guaranteed in the Sixth Amendment, when the 
military commissions were used. The trial records, however, did not allow for favorable results. 
The trial record did not record the arrest date in most cases. The trial records mainly showed the 
date of the general orders convening the commission, the date that the ‘crime’ commenced, and 
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the date of the trial itself. In many cases, the only dates recorded were the date that the 
commission convened and the date the trial began or continued. The only way to determine 
accurately the time of arrest, I imagine, would be to compare the trial records to the arrest 
records.  
There are a few trial records, however, such as the case of James Lane, that permit the 
supposition that the military trial was shortly after the arrest, relatively speaking.71
In a further attempt to examine the question of whether or not the military commissions were 
“speedy” trials, compared to the civilian court system, I examined scholarly studies of civilian 
criminal trials before and after the civil war. Historian David Bodenhamer writes about the 
criminal justice system in the state of Indiana prior to the Civil War. He starts his study from the 
point of indictment, rather than arrest, and so does not indicate an approximate duration from 
arrest to indictment. He does indicate, however, that the period could be extensive for a number 
 Lane, 
standing trial in Columbia, Missouri, was charged with “aiding the destruction of railroad 
property”. He pled "Guilty" to the charge, and was subsequently sentenced to “death by 
shooting”. Lane was lucky. He received a full pardon, and was released upon taking the oath of 
allegiance, upon consideration of his age and willingness to confess (a confession is included 
with his record). The trial record indicated that Lane participated in the destruction of the 
railroad on December 21, 1861. “February 25, 1862” is the date listed for the trial. Obviously, at 
some point prior to February 25, 1862, Lane was arrested, meaning that he was in prison for 
about two months at most, assuming that he was not immediately imprisoned for a period 
following the trial.  
                                                 
71 The War of The Rebellion: The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies Series 2, Volume 1, 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Library 1894 p. 451* 
* Hereafter, The War of the Rebellion: The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies will be cited as 
“OR: series 2, vol. 1, p. #” 
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of reasons, including an inefficient system for assembling a jury.72 In their book The Roots of 
Justice: Crime and Punishment in Alameda County, California 1870-1910, Lawrence Friedman 
and Robert Percival construct a comprehensive picture of the criminal justice system for 
Alameda County between 1870 and 1910. They explain that the judicial process, from arrest to 
trial start, took anywhere from three weeks to three months.73
The cases I studied range across fifteen states: Missouri, Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Georgia, Virginia, Arizona, Mississippi, Arkansas, Maryland, Illinois, Texas, 
North Carolina, and South Carolina. This selection of cases from both the National Archives and 
Official Records covers states in the South, the North, the Border States, and the West. South 
Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri provided the most cases. It is important to keep in 
mind, however, that I had 100 cases from Missouri alone before I went to the National Archives. 
I tried not to use files that I knew contained cases from Missouri, as a way of balancing Missouri 
with the other states. I also have six cases from the National Archives with no listed location of 
trial. I found 79 cases from Tennessee. I have 15 from Kentucky and 16 from South Carolina. 
For the South as a whole, I found 130 cases in my selection. This might suggest that half of the 
military commission trials that took place during the Civil War took place in the South, with the 
 Assuming that there were no major 
changes in the trial process before and after the Civil War, it is probable that the right to a 
‘speedy trial’ was not infringed on by use of the military commissions, because it is possible that 
the time between arrest and the start of the military commission trial was equal to that of a 
civilian trial.  
                                                 
72 Bodenhamer, David J. The Pursuit of Justice: Crime and Law in Antebellum Indiana Garland Publishing, Inc., 
New York and London: 1986, 66 
73 Friedman, Lawrence and Robert Percival The Roots of Justice: Crime and Punishment in Alameda County, 
California 11870-1910 University of North Carolina Press 1981, p. 167-170 
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other half split between the North, the Border States, and the West, with the highest number of 
trials in the Border States.  
The large number of cases in the Southern states may simply be explained as a ‘side effect’ 
of war. Wherever the army occupied, the military became the ruling authority. Historian Peter 
Maslowski writes: 
 
Wherever Union armies advanced, military commissions went with them to hear cases 
involving both civilians and military orders and regulations. When the local courts were not 
open, the commission would try cases of civil crimes and offenses normally heard by the local 
courts.74
 
 
In my study of different cases, I found 39 different charges brought against the various 
defendants. Each charge had its own specification, and in some cases, multiple specifications. 
While the “charge” was the general allegation of wrongdoing that the accused had committed, 
the “specification” gave the detailed description of how the defendant committed the offense. 
The case of Francis Walden, tried in June 1863, in Memphis, Tennessee, provides an example of 
a charge listed with a specification. The transcript of the case reads: 
 
Charge: Attempting to smuggle goods, contraband of war. 
Specification: In this, that on or about the 1st day of June, 1863, at Memphis, Tennessee, the 
said Francis M. Walden did unlawfully attempt to take, send carry, and convey a large amount of 
goods, wares, and merchandise to wit: one pistol and other goods, through and beyond the 
Federal lines at Memphis, Tennessee, and into territory under rebel and insurrectionary control.75
 
 
For a defendant to be found ‘guilty’, the judge advocate general needed to prove each 
specification of each charge. If the judge advocate general did not find the defendant guilty of 
                                                 
74 Maslowski, Peter Treason Must be Made Odious: Military Occupation and Wartime Reconstruction In Nashville, 
Tennessee 1862-1865 KTO Press: Milwood, NY: 1978, p. 64 
75 NA: NN1040 
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every specification of the charge, the defendant could not be found guilty of the charge. In one 
case, the trial of Langston Goode, taking place in 1862 at St. Louis, Missouri, the defendant was 
released because the judge advocate failed to prove all of the specifications of the charge, 
resulting in the inability of the court to find Goode guilty.76
 
  
Finding and sentence disapproved. While the commission evidently intended to convict the 
accused of charge 2 and its specification it failed to do so definitely.77
 
 
In March, 1862, Langston Goode was charged with “Violation of the laws of war” and 
“encouraging rebellion.” He pled ‘not guilty’ to both charges. The court found him guilty, and 
sentenced him to imprisonment, hard labor, and to have his property confiscated by the Union 
Army. Goode was ultimately released after taking the oath of allegiance to the Union and paying 
over a sum of money as bond. The money paid over to the court was held for as assurance that 
the pledge, usually the oath of allegiance to the Union, would be fulfilled.  
In another interesting case Henry Willing was tried by military commission in April of 1862, 
at Camp Pittsburg Landing, of three counts of aiding rebels, being an accessory to destruction of 
railroads and bridges, and “being a bad and dangerous man”. 78
The charges brought against defendants of Civil War military commissions ranged from acts 
that anyone familiar with a civilian criminal court system would be know of, such as robbery, to 
acts that might only occur in a time of war, such as “encouraging resistance or inciting 
 He pled “not guilty”, but was 
found “guilty” of all charges, except for the first charge, for which he was found “not guilty” of 
the specification to the charge. Willing was sentenced to death by shooting.  
                                                 
76 OR: Series 2, Vol. 1, p. 469 
77 Ibid. 
78 OR: Series 2, Vol. 1, p. 480 
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rebellion”. I found that fifteen of the 39 types of charges were already present in the civilian 
court system. These charges included “assault”, “murder”, and “prostitution”, to name a few. I 
found seventeen types of charges in my selection of cases that could only be used during 
wartime, such as “encouraging resistance,” “aiding rebels,” and “violation of oath of allegiance 
to the Union.” Additional charges dealt with the treatment, use, or possession of property, 
including sabotage, such as “destroying telegraph lines,” “bridge burning,” or “smuggling.” 
Charges like these (I found five others for a total of seven), could potentially be brought against a 
defendant in either war or peace. Some charges were very general in scope, encompassing all of 
these things, such as “violation of the laws of war.” A defendant could be charged with a 
“violation of the laws of war” for aiding rebels, inciting rebellion, sabotage, or other acts that 
were not considered proper acts of warfare in accordance with the Laws of War, or laws 
governing military authority in times of war. Other charges were very specific, such as “selling 
intoxicating liquors to soldiers.” 
I studied 262 individual trials of 262 individuals listed in the records at the National 
Archives. Some defendants had only one charge against them, such as Fredrick Schneider, who 
in 1865, was charged with “Selling intoxicating liquors to soldiers”.79 Others were charged with 
multiple crimes, like William Yocum, of Cairo, Illinois, who faced four charges: kidnapping, 
violation of the laws of war, bribery, and “betraying trust.”80
When faced with the task of entering a plea, most defendants chose to plead “Not Guilty,” 
even though most were found “Guilty” by the military court. Out of the 368  total charges 
entered against the 262 individuals, 277 pleas of “Not Guilty” were entered.
  
81
                                                 
79 NA: OO1321 
 Take, for example, 
80 NA: NN4017 
81 Forty-one of the 368 total listed charges are missing a record of how the defendant pled.  
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the charge “violation of the laws of war”. More people were charged with “violation of the laws 
of war” than almost any other crime. Of the nearly forty different individuals charged with 
“violation of the laws of war”, thirty-five of them pled “not guilty”. All but one of these people, 
however, were found guilty. The same pattern also holds for charges involving any form of aid 
or support to Confederate soldiers or sympathizers. Out of forty-two individuals charged with 
giving some form of aid to Confederate sympathizers or Confederate soldiers, only seven 
actually pled ‘guilty’. In addition to these seven, twenty-six others were found guilty after 
entering original pleas of “not guilty”. Of the 368 charges against the 262 individuals, 228 
charges became convictions.82
The charges brought against defendants of the military commissions carried different 
sentences with them. For the most part, except for cases in which death could be a sentence, or 
was ordered (in which case the higher authorities had to approve the sentence) sentencing was 
left up to the discretion of the military commission.
  
83 Sometimes, two people could be found 
guilty of the exact same charge and still receive different sentences. One instance of treason 
might carry a sentence of “death by shooting” and another “imprisonment”. Crimes of sabotage 
often carried severe penalties, usually death. Some charges, such as a “violation of the laws of 
war” carried a sentence of “hard labor” or “fine” of one or more hundreds or thousands of 
dollars, in addition to imprisonment.84
                                                 
82 Twelve of the 368 total charges failed to list whether or not the defendant was convicted.  
 In some circumstances, even though the defendant was 
found “not guilty” and released, the defendant still had to pay over a bond and take what was 
known as the “oath of allegiance.” The officers on the commission administered this oath. This 
oath, recorded by the commission and signed by the commission and the defendant, stated that 
83 Davis, 313 
84 OR: Series 2, Vol. 1, p. 282-501 
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the defendant pledged allegiance to the United States and would not take any action that might 
aid those looking to cause rebellion against the United States. It is important to note that the 
location of the trial, whether the trial occurred in a military zone of the South or Border States, or 
a Northern state that was not in rebellion,  probably played a role in the findings of the court and 
how the sentence was administered.  
In the records of the military commissions of the Civil War, there are instances in which, 
upon a conviction and a sentence, the prisoner was released from custody based on some unique 
circumstance. One fascinating case is that of James Quisenberry, tried in February 1862, in 
Columbia, Missouri.85 Quisenberry was arrested and charged with aiding the destruction of 
railroad property. He pled guilty to this charge. He also issued a statement to the commission. In 
this statement, he gave some background about himself, stating that he would be eighteen years 
old in August of that year. He confirms that, yes, he was present when the railroad tracks were 
torn up, but was taken against his will, at the mercy of older men, whom he thought would have 
his interests at heart, to an unknown location.86
 
 The commission sentenced Quisenberry to death 
by shooting. However, after the trial, a number of officers appealed to higher-ranking officers for 
a lesser sentence of Quisenberry because of his youth. The officers wrote:  
…the members of the court without exception recommend his case to the commanding 
general as a fit one in which to exercise clemency and recommend that he be pardoned and 
released on taking the oath of allegiance and giving bonds for his future good behavior.87
 
  
Ultimately, this new sentence was approved and carried out.  
  
                                                 
85 OR: Series 2, Vol. 1, p. 449-451 
86 Ibid.  
87 Ibid 
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One of the most intriguing cases I found while researching at the National Archives was 
the case of Henry Moul, tried by military commission in May, 1864, in Pittsburgh (then spelled 
‘Pittsburg’), Pennsylvania.88
Henry Moul, citizen, was arrested and charged with aiding Private Adam Moul, Henry’s 
brother, in desertion from the United States Military (formally, the charge was phrased “aiding 
the desertion of a union soldier”). Moul argued against the charge by appealing, like so many 
others, to a lack of jurisdiction. After being found guilty of the charge, he moved for a new trial, 
but was denied. He was held at the County Jail of Allegheny County. One letter reports that upon 
visiting Henry in jail, one of the members of the commission and the presiding judge found the 
defendant “so stupid” that he did not know the cause of his arrest and the charges brought against 
him.
 At the archives, this file included one of the most complete case 
files I found. It included transcripts of the trial, affidavits from witnesses, evidence exhibits, and 
petitions for mercy from family members. Another interesting point about this file is that it 
contained a document signed by President Lincoln himself.  
89
Men certainly were not the only people arrested and tried by military commission during 
the course of the Civil War. Women were also arrested and tried this way. I found fourteen 
military commission trials of women. Most of these trials took place in Tennessee. About half of 
 A letter dated a few months later from an examining doctor determined that he had a 
“dullness of comprehension”. The doctor concurred with the prior recommendations that Mr. 
Moul be extended a full pardon. In the back of the file, on the bottom left of a scrap of paper 
already cluttered with the handwriting of at least three people, are approximately three lines in 
thick, jagged cursive writing. President Lincoln wrote, “Sentence remitted” and signed his name. 
In due course, Henry Moul was released.  
                                                 
88 NA: MM1431 
89 Ibid. 
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the women in these cases were charged with prostitution. The other half were mostly charged 
with “attempted smuggling,” except in three cases. In Nashville, Tennessee, July 1864, Mary 
Reynolds was found “not guilty” of “being a rebel spy,” “treason,” and “violations of the laws of 
war.” Ms. Reynolds was released, but “banished to Northern territories.”90 This sentence, 
banishment, appears to be a common sentence for the women. This does not mean that the 
officers of the military commissions were afraid to sentence women to harsh punishment. Eliza 
Stillman, tried in Memphis, Tennessee, in September 1863, was sentenced to “one year of hard 
labor” upon a finding of “guilty” for “making a false oath.”91
Historian Peter Maslowski seems to confirm these findings in his book 
 
Treason Must be 
made Odious: Military Occupation and Wartime Reconstruction In Nashville, Tennessee 1862-
1865
Maslowski dedicates a whole chapter of his book to the study of what one might call 
“social wrongs,” such as drinking and prostitution. There is a large record of civilians tried by 
the military for such offenses. Maslowski explains: 
. In this study, Maslowski details the changes that took place during the course of 
Tennessee’s reconstruction. He explains how appointing Andrew Johnson as military governor 
of Tennessee created a change in the reconstruction environment. He details how Johnson and 
other military and civilian leaders in Tennessee clashed over the dual goals of winning the war 
and restoring society.  
 
                                                 
90 NA: NN3275 
91 NA: LL1341 
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There is no evidence that the army tried to control liquor and prostitution as a moral 
crusade. Instead, military authorities acted out of self-defense. Drunken and diseased soldiers 
were of little value to the army….92
 
 
 
It is easy to see the great variety in the application of procedures in the military 
commissions. From who was tried, where the defendants were tried, to the charges brought 
against each defendant, to how each defendant was sentenced, there seems to be no true rule that 
was followed. One might say that the juryless military commission trials were unfair because of 
their lack of predictability and the lack of uniform application of law.  
 
 
                                                 
92 Maslowski, 131 
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12.0  SHEDDING LIGHT 
When Americans think of a trial, one of the key elements that comes to mind is the presence of a 
jury. The jury trial has been considered one of the foundations of freedom throughout the course 
of English and American history. Unfortunately, however, this civil liberty has not always been 
protected.  
In the time after the events of September 11, 2001, President Bush issued executive 
orders to suspend the writ of Habeas Corpus and allow detainees who were arrested and held in 
military prisons in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to be held without a trial indefinitely. In 
order to understand how one of the most protected civil liberties in America has been suspended 
in the present, it is crucial to understand how similar events have occurred in the past. It is 
important to understand the past events because they form the precedent for the present events.  
Many historians writing from as far back as the immediate post-Civil War era and as 
recently as this year have studied the Lincoln Administration’s suspension of the civil liberty of a 
trial by jury. Some, like Daniel Farber, have focused on the Constitutional debate surrounding 
the use of military trials to try civilians and the suspension of Habeas Corpus. Others, such as 
Mark E. Neely, have studied the numbers of citizens who were arrested and held in military 
prisons throughout the course of the war. Writing in the 1880s, John A. Marshall wrote narrative 
accounts of various Northern citizens, mainly Democrats, who were arrested and tried by the 
military.  
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I chose to study an aspect of the suspension of civil liberties that has been overlooked by 
other historians. I wanted to know the nature of the military trials of civilians, called the military 
commissions. These trials, conducted similarly to a courts-martial trial, did not permit the 
civilian defendant to present his or her case before a jury, but rather, a commission, or panel, of 
military officers. My study of both the 100 cases from the Official Records of the Union and 
Confederate Armies and 162 cases from the National Archives has created a rough image of how 
the trial process was conducted, from the time the defendant went before the commission to the 
verdict, to any post-trial events, such as friends and family of the defendants petitioning the 
President to reduce the sentence of a loved one.  
The 262 cases also showed great variety in the crimes charged against defendants. Most 
were charged with the generally named crime “violation of the laws of war” or crimes of 
assisting Confederate soldiers or sympathizers. Other charges were only filed against a few 
people in my case selection, such as women who were charged with prostitution, or men who 
were charged with robbery.  
I have been studying these 262 cases, the suspension of Habeas Corpus, the use of 
military commissions, the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln, the Constitution, and many other 
components of this project for about a year. Throughout this time, I have read dozens of opinions 
on Lincoln’s suspension of Habeas Corpus and his use of military commissions to try civilians. 
Because of the controversy surrounding these wartime measures, I have tried to conduct and 
present my study in the most neutral fashion possible. This does not mean, however, that I have 
not formed an opinion on this matter. 
Personally, I believe that the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus should not have been 
suspended in the non-military districts of the Northern States, where the civilian courts were 
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allowed to remain open. My research of the 262 military commission cases confirms this for me. 
If the writ of Habeas Corpus were not suspended, military commissions would not have tried 
civilians. Instead, civilians would have been tried for their offenses in Federal Court in front of a 
jury. The use of the military commissions was a violation of the Fifth Amendment. In the Fifth 
Amendment, a distinction is made between military and civilian law. It specifically states that 
military law applies only “…when in actual service in time of war or public danger….”93
In 1866, the Supreme Court sat to decide the case of Lamdin Milligan. The Supreme 
Court recognized the gravity of the question at hand: “Had this tribunal the legal authority to try 
and punish this man?”
 This 
means that the law of the military cannot apply to civilians, whether a time of war or a time of 
peace. While I understand that Lincoln and his administration believed that they were doing what 
was necessary to protect the union, I believe that civil liberties should always be first priority. 
The founding fathers made sure to include a Bill of Rights to the Constitution so that liberties 
would always be protected.  
94 In other words, was the military commission used to try Milligan a legal 
court? In the opinion, Justice Davis wrote “…it is the birthright of every American citizen when 
charged with a crime to be tried and punished according to the law.”95 In spite of this, the court 
does not disagree with the Lincoln Administration’s suspension of the writ of Habeas Corpus or 
the use of military trials in areas “where war really prevails”.96
I mentioned earlier that the Milligan case has not been overruled, according to Shepard’s. 
This is especially important when considering current events. After September 11, 2001, 
 However, military law cannot 
have authority over civilians.  
                                                 
93 Emphasis added 
94 Ex parte Milligan 71 US 2 (1866) 
95 Ibid 
96 Ibid 
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civilians have been detained by the United States Military for supposed connections with 
terrorist organizations. Under the Bush Administration, the writ of Habeas Corpus was 
suspended, and detainees, if brought to trial at all, were tried by military commissions. The 
Milligan decision still holds that civilians cannot be tried by military courts where civilian courts 
are sitting. While the suspension of the right to a trial by jury during the Civil War does not 
exactly match the current suspension of the right to a jury trial, the suspension of this civil liberty 
during the Civil War is relevant today. Milligan is relevant because it provides the foundation 
that the more recent Supreme Court cases (previously mentioned) relied upon to determine that 
the Guantanamo Bay detainees: deserve the ability to petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus, are 
allowed a trial by jury under the United States Constitution, and protection under the Geneva 
Conventions. 
I would have liked to do a study of 262 selected cases from Guantanamo detainees. I then 
would have gone on to compare the data to my selected cases from the Civil War. It would be 
interesting to compare the transcripts of the trials, to compare modern military commission 
proceedings with those of the Civil War era. I also would have liked to compare the charges 
against the detainees from both eras, as well as case outcomes, the number of detainees who pled 
“guilty” or “not guilty” to charges, and so on. According to the American Civil Liberties Union’s 
Guantanamo Factsheet (updated November 2008), about 775 people total have been detained 
since 2002.97 As of October 31, 2008, 255 people were still in the military prison.98
                                                 
97 Guantanamo Factsheet, American Civil Liberties Union, November 2008, November 2008. 
 
Unfortunately, I did not have access to cases from detainees of the Guantanamo Bay military 
prison beyond the publically accessible opinions of the United States Supreme Court.  
www.aclu.org  
98 Ibid. 
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Overall, my hope is that this study of selected cases has shed light on an era in American 
history seldom discussed. By shedding light on this still highly controversial area in a new way, I 
hope to give a more thorough, unbiased understanding of what actually occurred. From this, it 
becomes clear that we, even in present times, are still influenced by the events of the Civil War.  
The transcripts of the military commissions can give a multi-dimensional illustration of 
the suspension of the right to a jury trial in the Civil War. Instead of simply understanding that a 
suspension of the right to a jury trial occurred, or that the arrest records of the time list that X 
amount of people were arrested on a certain date, the military commission records can help 
explain how the system operated. 
While researching the military commission records, as is often the case in research, I 
found that I had, and still have, more questions than answers. A number of these questions can be 
answered using the information I have already collected. A few might require additional 
research. The military commission records would be the base for each of these ideas.  
The first, and maybe most obvious, comparison would involve a comparison of the 
military commissions authorized by the Union government and those authorized by the 
Confederate government. In two books, Southern Rights: Political Prisoners and the Myth of 
Confederate Constitutionalism (1999) and Confederate Bastille: Jefferson Davis and Civil 
Liberties (1993), Neely again uses the arrest records to study the disruption of the right to a trial 
by jury.99
                                                 
99 Neely, Mark E. University of Virginia Press, Marquette University Press, respectively. 
 It would be interesting to find military commissions conducted by the Confederate 
government, and using the same research model as my present study, collect data on these 
commissions in the same fashion. The two sets could then be compared.  
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Additionally, there are a number of different studies that could be completed by 
comparing civilian trials with the military commissions. First, I would want to compare the 
civilian criminal court procedures of the mid-1800s with the military commissions. This could be 
completed through the view of a charge that was common to both courts, for example, robbery. 
Second, the comparison could extend to modern civilian criminal trials. The civilian and military 
trials could be compared with the research model I have already designed. The comparison could 
be expanded, however, to include additional topics, such as “time of crime” and “time of arrest.” 
This new information, in addition to the already recorded “time of trial,” could be used to more 
fully determine whether or not the military commissions of the Civil War respected the right to a 
“speedy” trial.  
One of the most interesting studies comparing the military and civilian courts involves 
evidence. Both civilian trials, from the Civil War and in the present, and military commissions 
used evidence. Evidence admission and use in civilian trials today is conducted in accordance to 
the Federal Rules of Evidence at the federal level, and the individual state Rules of Evidence at 
the state level courts. What rules, if any, guided evidence procedures for civilian trials during the 
Civil War? While reading the trial transcripts at the National Archives, I noticed that, in the 
records of cases that contained evidence, no objections were recorded. What, if any, rules of 
evidence guided the military commission trials? Were objections made and simply not recorded? 
Or were no objections made? In modern trials, proper evidence procedure is one of the 
foundations of a fair trial. Answering these questions can help to determine whether or not the 
military commissions can be called “fair” trials.  
Lastly, the military commission records can be studied alone. The cases can be divided 
by location. This may reveal patterns that are not visible when the cases are compared across the 
 63 
board. For example, dividing the cases East-West may show that more people in the East were 
found guilty of a certain charge than in the West. Or, Charge X was more frequently used in the 
North. And so on. This type of study may allow for the most variety.   
 It is my hope that this study of 262 military commission cases from the Civil War has 
given Civil War historians another tool that future Civil War historians can use to view the 
disruption of the right to a jury trial under the Lincoln Administration. 
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APPENDIX A 
RESEARCH METHOD 
This is a sample from the spreadsheet I used to record the information I found in the 
military commission records from both the Official Records and the National Archives. 
 
Table 1: Sample of Research Notes/Spreadsheet 
Name Date Location Charges Plea Verdict Sentence 
Rodgers, 
John 
Notes 
8-6-
1864 
Cincinnati, 
OH 
Violation of 
Oath of 
Allegiance 
Guilty Guilty "To 
remain 
within 
the limits 
of 
Greene 
Co, OH 
until end 
of war" 
Sentence 
Approved 
Lynch, 
David 
9-19-
1864 
Pittsburgh, 
PA 
Harboring 
deserters, 
Defrauding 
US govt 
Not 
Guilty, 
Not 
Guilty 
Not 
Guilty, 
Not 
Guilty 
Released Approved 
Bennett, 
Joseph 
10-30-
1863 
Pilot 
Knob, MO 
Encouraging 
guerrillas 
Not 
Guilty 
Guilty Banished 
from 
state 
Sentence 
Disapproved,  
prisoner to 
be released 
and pay 
$2,000 fine 
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